ALIEN INHERITANCE STATUTES AND THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS POWER
State alien inheritancestatutes of the "benefit" or "reciprocity"
type have provided the states with a means of attempting to
influence the inheritancelaws ofJoreign nations, and have been
utilized by some statejudges to express disapprovalofparticular
Jbreign governments. This note analyzes the potential conflict
between these statutes and the exclusive federal foreign relations
power in light of a recent Supreme Court decision finding an
alien inheritance statute to be an unconstitutional interference
with federal authority.
While abrogating the common law rule that absolutely proscribed
inheritance of real and personal property by non-resident aliens,' a
substantial number of American states2 have enacted either "benefit"
or "reciprocity" regulations which provide for alien inheritance only
if certain requirements are met. Reciprocity statutes allow inheritance
only if it is shown that the foreign country in which the heir is a citizen
allows an American heir to inherit property within its borders upon
the same terms as citizens of that country inherit property.' Such
IAt common law an alien could acquire realty by purchase but not by devise or intestate
succession and, even in the former situation, could not hold land against the king. 2
BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES 293: Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 603
(1813). See generally Boyd, Treaties Governing the Succession to Real Property by Aliens. 51
MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1001-05 (1953). The common-law disabilities havebeen repealed altogether
in some states and modified by the statute in all others. See Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: A Reevaluation, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 15 (1962).
' Well over one third of the states have enacted some form of alien inheritance statute. See
notes 3 & 5 infra.
ISection 259 of the California Probate Code, the prototype of the reciprocal rights restriction,
provides: "The right of aliens not residing within the United States to take real [and personall
property in this State by succession or testamentary disposition . . . is dependent in each case
upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the United States to take real
[and personal] property upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the
respective countries of which such aliens are residents .. " CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (Vest
1956). For similar enactments in other states, see ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-212(c) (1956);
IOWA CODE § 567.8 (Supp. 1966): MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-520 (1964); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 134.230-.250 (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 64-3 (1966); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 121
(1963); ORE. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1967); WYO. STAT. ANN. 2-43.1 (Supp. 1967). See
generally Note, State Statutes AJfecting the Inheritanceand Distributionof Estates to Foreign
Heirs, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 141, 142-43.
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statutes commonly provide for escheat to the state if the alien heir

cannot sustain the burden of showing reciprocity and if there are no
other domestic heirs Benefit statutes typically provide that a nonresident alien must show that he will be able to enjoy the benefit, use

and control of the inheritance before the probate court will release it
to him.' Unlike the reciprocity statutes, these regulations are not

confiscatory since if the heir cannot sustain the burden of proof,6 the
inheritance is paid into the court until such time as the heir can
establish that he will receive the benefit of inheritance.' The state
enactments which presume to govern the property rights of foreign
nationals have long been recognized -as creating a potential federalistic

conflict between the states' governmental interest in and power over
the devolution of property within their boundaries and the national

government's power in the ill-defined area of foreign relations.' The
E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 259.1 (West, 1967 Supp.): "The burden shall be upon nonresident aliens to establish the existence of the reciprocal rights.
...
See In re Bevilacqua's
Estate, 31 Cal. 2d 580, 591 P.2d 752 (1948) (§ 259.1 held not invalid as arbitrary). Reciprocity
statutes further typically provide that "[ilf such reciprocal rights are not found to exist and if no
heirs other than such aliens are found eligible to take such property, the property shall be
disposed of as escheated property." CAL. PROB.CODE § 259.2 (West 1956).
For the burden of proof provision of the Oregon statute, see note 51 injra.
5Typical of these laws is section 2218-2 of the New York Surrogate Court Procedure Act:
"Where it shall appear that a beneficiary would not have the benefit or use or control of the
money or other property due him or where other special circumstances make it desirable that
such payment should be withheld the decree may direct that such money or property be paid into
court for the benefit of the beneficiary or the person or persons who may thereafter appear to be
entitled thereto. The money or property so paid into court shall be paid out only upon order of
the court or pursuant to the order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction." N.Y.
SURR. CT. PRO. LAW § 2218-2 (McKinney Supp. 1968). Other "benefit" statutes are CONN .N
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-278 (1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.28 (1964); MD.ANN. CODE art.
93, § 161 (1963); MASS. ANN LAWS ch. 206, § 27A (Supp. 1966); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 27.3178 (306a) (1962); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3A:25-10 (1953); OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 2113.81-83 (Page Supp. 1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 320.737, 1156 (Supp.
1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-13-13 (1956).
6 E.g., N.Y SUtRR. CT. PRO. LAW § 2218-3 (McKinney Supp. 1968): "In any such
proceeding where it is uncertain that an alien beneficiary or fiduciary. . . would have the benefit
or use or control of the money or property due him the burden of proving that the alien
beneficiary will receive the benefit or use or control of the money or property due him shall be
upon him or the person claiming from, through or under him."
'See note 5 supra.
2See Boyd, The Invalidity of State Statutes Governing the Share oJ Nonresident Aliens in
Decedents' Estates. 5 G. o.L.J. 470,492-500 (1963); Comment, State Reciprocit'Statte.i and
the Inheritance Rights of Nonresident Aliens, 1963 Duke L.J. 315, 316; Comment, Right oJ
Non-Resident Alien to Take Real and Personal Property. 25 So. CAL. L. REv. 329 (1952);
Comment, State Regulation on Nonresident Alien Inheritance-An Anonoly in Foreign

Vol. 1969: 153]

A LIEN INHERITA NCE STA TUTES

United States Supreme Court, in its recent decision of Zschernig v.
Miller, has considered the conflict and attempted to set forth new
guides for its resolution.
State alien inheritance statutes were first challenged as
unconstitutional infringements upon the exclusive power of the federal
government over foreign affairs in Clark v. Allen.10 In that case the
petitioners contended that the promotion of the rights of American
citizens to inherit abroad by offering to aliens reciprocal rights of
inheritance in California was a matter for settlement solely by the
federal government on a nation-wide basis." In summarily rejecting
this argument as "farfetched"' 2 and in sustaining the constitutionality
of the statute, the Court stated that devolution rights are determined
by state law in the absence of an overriding federal policy such as a
treaty requiring a given disposition of property.' 3 Since there were no
Policy. 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 329 (1951); Note, State Statutes Affecting the Inheritance and
Distribution oJ Estates to Foreign Heirs, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 141, 148-49.
'389 U.S. 429 (1968).
10331 U.S. 503 (1947). Clark involved a trio of claimants to the estate of a California
testatrix: (I) the German beneficiaries under the will who claimed the right to inherit both real
and personal property by virtue of Article IV of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Consular Rights with Germany, December 8, 1923, art. IV, 44 Stat. 2132, T.S. No. 725, see
note 14 infra; (2) the California heirs at law of the testatrix who argued that the treaty had been
abrogated by a state of war between the signatories, and further that, since Germany did not
grant reciprocal inheritance rights to Americans, the estate should vest in them by virtue of the
California reciprocity statute, see note 3 supra; and (3) the federal Alien Property Custodian
whose claim to the estate was based on the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C.
Appendix § 6 (1964). See Crowley v. Allen, 52 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
Regarding the applicability of California's reciprocity statute, the District Court accepted the
German heirs' argument that the statute was unconstitutional because its legislative histor
indicated a "design . . . to fix a policy of international relations, which, the [California]
Iegislature thought, would aid the United States in anticipated hostilities with a foreign
government." Crowley v. Allen, 52 F. Supp. 850, 853-54 (N.D. Cal. 1943). The Ninth Circuit
held it improper to rely on legislative motive in order to determine the constitutionality of state
legislation, Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653, 660 (9th Cir. 1946), and before the U.S. Supreme
Court the heirs apparently abandoned the argument based on legislative motive, contending
instead that any state offer of reciprocal rights to foreign nationals was an infringement on the
exclusive federal power over foreign affairs. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 433 n.5
(1968); Clark v. Allen. 331 U.S. 503, 516 (1947).
"331 U.S. at 516-17.
Id. at 517.
""Rights of succession to property are determined by local law. See Lyeth v. Hoer. 305 U.S.
188, 193; Irving Trust Co. v. Day. 314 U.S. 556, 562. Those rights may be affected by an
overriding federal policy, as where a treaty makes different or conflicting arrangements." Id. at
517. But see text at notes 17-25 infra.
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applicable treaty provisions to control succession to personal property

in this case, the Court found no need for state law to yield with regard
to personalty. 4 Moreover, the Court stated that the statute had not
entered the prohibited area of negotiating or making a compact with a
foreign nation. Finally, the Court concluded that the state law did not
"cross the forbidden line" and interfere with the federal government's

domain over foreign relations since any effect such alien inheritance
legislation might have in foreign countries would be merely

"incidental or indirect."'"
The Clark decision may be criticized as extending undue deference
to the states' interest in the regulation of inheritance by aliens, while

underestimating the effects of such regulation upon foreign relations,' 6
since the Court implied that, in the absence of overt state. negotiat ion
with a foreign nation, only a clearly defined federal policy, such as one
embodied in a treaty, could restrict state laws regarding devolution."

State property and inheritance laws, like any other state action, are
subject to applicable Constitutional limitations and, thus, may be
"Clark also involved the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with
Germany, December 8, 1923, art. IV, 44 Stat. 2132, T.S. No. 725. The Court held that the
provision of the treaty allowing aliens to dispose of realty which, under local law, their alienage
would prevent them from holding was not incompatible with national policy in time of war. 331
U.S. at 514. However, as construed by the Court, the treaty did not cover personal property
located within the United States which an American national undertakes to leave to German
nationals. Id. at 516.
"Id. at 517.
"See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 8, at 493; Moore, Federalismand ForeignRelations, 1965 DUKE
L.J. 248, 309-10.
",See text at notes 10-15 supra. The Court had previously indicated that the state's power
regarding the testamentary disposition of property was virtually absolute. In Irving Trust Co. v.
Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942), the Court said: "Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the
legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition
over property within its jurisdiction." See United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 320 (1876): Mager
v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 490 (1850); cf. United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 93 (1950);
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 541-42 (1919). Taken out of context, the Court's statement
suggests that the states possess unbridled discretion regarding the privilege of testamentary
disposition. That Irving Trust does not stand for so broad a proposition is demonstrated by the
very issue scrutinized in that case-whether, consistent with due process and the contract clause
of the Constitution, New York could annex a wife's right of election to the privilege of executing
a will. Probably a more accurate statement of the scope of state power is found in Mager v,
Grima, supra: "lI]f a state may deny [inheritance to aliens] altogether, it follows that, when it
grants it, it may annex to the grant any conditions which it supposes to be required b' its
interests orpolicy." 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 493 (emphasis added). Moreover, in none of these cases
was there a question whether state regulation of succession must yield to conflicting federal
action based upon one of the delegated powers of the national government. See note 18 infra.
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preempted by conflicting federal action taken pursuant to one of the
delegated powers of the national government. In the past, the
Supreme Court has sustained the preemption of such state regulation
by both statute'8 and treaty.' 9 Similarly, the due process clause has
been frequently invoked to challenge statutory modifications of the
estate system, 20 and the equal protection clause has been held to
preclude the application of a state alien land law in circumstances in
which it would be racially discriminatory.2' Moreover, the federal
" Where Congress has legislated re~arding property devolution, the Court has seen little
difficulty sustaining this action, even though it partially preempted existing state statutes. A
United States statute provides that when a veteran dies intestate and without legal heirs in a
veteran's hospital, his personal property "shall immediately vest in and become the property of
the United States as trustee for the sole use and benefit of the General Post Fund .. " 38
U.S.C. § 5220 (1964). The Court sustained this provision on the ground that the powers to
raise armies and navies and to conduct war permit Congress to legislate as to veterans, saying:
"The fact that this law pertains to the devolution of property does not render it invalid.
Although it is true that this is an area normally left to the States, it is not immune under the
Tenth Amendment from laws passed by the Federal Government which are, as is the law here,
necessary and proper to the exercise of a delegated power." United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S.
643, 649 (1961).
11E.g.. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947);
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1889); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488-90
(1879).
The regulation of inheritance by nonresident aliens has frequently been a provision in
American treaties. See Boyd, supra note 1,at 1006-07, 1009-13; Meekison, Treaty Provisions
for the Inheritance of Personal Property, 44 Ai. J. lNr'L L. 313, 314 & nn. 5-26 (1950);
Note, U. CI. L. REV. 315, 321 & n. 41 (1949). With respect to realty, American treaties
have generally granted aliens only a qualified right of succession. In the event alienage is a bar
to succession under state law, the standard American treaty formula guarantees nonresident and
resident aliens the right to sell their shares in any decedent's real property located in the United
States within a specified period of time. See Boyd, supra, at 1009-19. By contrast a number of
treaties have stipulated that if an alien dies owning personalty in the United States, his beneficiaries, regardless of nationality, are entitled to the personality without any limitations. See
Meekison, supra. Under present treaty practice, aliens are granted the same right of sale for
both realty and personalty. E.g., Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Pakistan, Nov. 12,
1959, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 110, 115 (art. 9, para. 2), T.I.A.S. No. 4683; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with Nicaragua, Jan. 21, 1956, [1958] 9 U.S.T. 449, 456-57 (art. 9,
para. 2), T.I.A.S. No. 4024.
"See, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (1941); Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass.
786, 151 N.E.2d 475 (1958). See also LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH CENTER, U. OF MICH. LAW
SCHOOL. CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION, 1953-1954 at 625-38 (1955).
: Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1947). Undoubtedly the constitutional guarantees of
due process and equal protection of the laws are fully available to resident aliens. E.g.. Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1947); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 411 (1930) (fourteenth
amendment "extends to aliens"); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886). Seealso 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 279 (1942); Boyd,
supra note 8, at 481-92; Comment, TheAlien and the Constitution, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 547, 564-
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power over foreign affairs has traditionally been accorded a special
status under the Constitution22 since the need for uniformity in dealing
69 (1953). However, the applicability of these guarantees to nonresident aliens is somewhat
problematical. The due process clause has, by its terms, no jurisdictional limitation and could be
invoked to protect the vested property rights of nonresident aliens against an unreasonable
taking by a state. See Boyd, supra note 8, at 482-85 & n.63. Since the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause is limited to "any person within [the state's] jurisdiction," it is doubtful
that a nonresident alien could utilize this guarantee. See Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 26061 (1898) (dictum); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (dictum). Recent
commentators have contended that a territorial construction is too narrow, suggesting that
ownership of property within the state or "legislative jurisdiction" involving certain minimal
contacts with a state would be more realistic standards for invoking the equal protection
guarantee. Currie & Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal
Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 5-10 (1960); Note, PropertyRights ol Aliens under Iowa and
FederalLaw, 47 IOwA L. REv. 105, 114-15 (1961).
" For example, the power to expel undesirable aliens, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698 (1893), the power to acquire territory by discovery and occupation, Jones v. United
States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890), and the power to make such international agreements as do not
-constitute treaties in the constitutional sense, United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937),
have been sustained as valid exercises of the federal foreign affairs power.
Although it is generally believed that the federal foreign relations power is exclusive, see note
24 infra, the source of the power has been the subject of some debate. One school of thought
maintains that national sovereignty supports the exercise of national power in the international
sphere without the necessity of a specific constitutional referrent for the action. This theory
received its fullest judicial explication by Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936): "As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the
colonies acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the
colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United
States of America. . . . The Union existed before the Constitution, which was ordained and
established among other things to form 'amore perfect Union.' Prior to that event, it is clear
that the Union, declared by the Articles of Confederation to be 'perpetual,' was the sole
possessor of external sovereignty. . . . It results that the investment of the federal government
with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the
Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to
maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the
Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of
nationality." Id. at 316-18. See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)
(Field, J.) (dictum); The Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (Field, J.) (dictum); (J.
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). See generally E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND
POWERS, 1787-1957 at 170-73 (4th ed. 1957). Mr. Justice Sutherland's theory and the historical
analysis supporting it have been seriously questioned. See Levitan, The Foreign Relations
Powers:An Analysis of Mr. JusticeSutherland'sTheory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946).
Arguably, however, the plenary nature of the federal foreign relations power can be implied as
a resultant of a group of expressly delegated national powers and prohibitions on state action.
U.S. CONST.art. 1,§ 8, cls. 1-3; art. I1l, § 2, cl.I; art. VI, cl.
2. This theory has the virtue of
being consistent with the view that our national government is one of delegated powers, and is
preferred by most commentators. E.g.. Q. WRIGHT. THE CONTROL O. AMERICAN I'OREIGN
RELATIONS 132-34 (1922); Levitan, supra at 493 n. 102; Quarles, The FederalGovernment:As to
Foreign Affairs. Are Its Powers Inherent as DistinguishedIron) Delegated? 32 GOo. L.J. 375
(1944).
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with international affairs was of prime concern to the framers of the
Constitution.3 The Supreme Court has frequently maintained that
federal authority over matters affecting foreign affairs is exclusive.24
Thus, to interpret Clark as ruling that state regulation of succession
necessarily has too "indirect" an effect on foreign affairs to be

constitutionally unremonstrable would conflict with the Court's
tradition of jealousy in guarding the federal government's control over

all matters of foreign relations." Therefore, it may be contended that
Clark merely stands for the proposition that a state may establish an
inheritance scheme for aliens on a reciprocity basis.
However, encouraged by the broad interpretation of Clark, courts
applying alien inheritance statutes seem frequently to have gone

beyond the designated statutory considerations of benefit and
reciprocal inheritance rights to import foreign policy considerations

into the probate proceedings.
" See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 3, 4, 5,22,42 & 80. See generally C. vARREN, THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1937).
:'See, e.g.. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 232 (1942) (dictum), where the Court stated:
"Here, we are dealing with an exclusive federal function. If state laws and policies did not yield
before the exercise of the external powers of the United States, then our foreign policy might be
thwarted." See also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937). Only once has the
Court considered the possibility that the states may have some concurrent power to take action
that might affect foreign relations. In Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1940), the Court stated:
"[T]his [Congressional] legislation is in a field which affects international relations, the one
aspect of our government that from the first has been most generally conceded imperatively to
demand broad national authority. Any concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to the
narrowest of limits .. " Id. at 68. Elsewhere the Hines Court noted: "Experience has shown
that international controversies of the gravest moment, sometimes even leading to war, may
arise from real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government.' hL at 64.
While the Court has frequently maintained that federal power over foreign affairs is
exclusive, see note 24 supra, it is noteworthy that the negative implications of this exclusiveness
have never been relied upon to proscribe state activities that might interfere with foreign affairs.
Only in Holmes v. Vennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840), can there be found a clearly
enunciated judicial exposition of the preemptive effect of the dormant federal foreign relations
power. That case presented the question whether the governor of Vermont could constitutionally
arr st and extradite a fugitive indicted for murder in Canada. Against a back-drop of U.S.Canadian negotiations over matters which included extradition, Chief Justice Taney reasoned
that ad hoe state extraditions would diminish the ability of the federal government to induce
neighboring countries to enter into such treaties, and thus that such state action was repugnant
to the constitutionally warranted federal power over international affairs. Id. at 574-75. The
Supreme Court, however, not being able to decide on a course of action, finally dismissed the
writ of error for want of jurisdiction. Id. at 597; cJ. Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 340
(1901) (U.S. Constitution does not prohibit a state's granting inheritance rights to nonresident
aliens). See generally Moore, supra note 16, at 299-311.
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Despite minor variations,26 the prevailing statutory scheme of

reciprocity which is intended to induce foreign nations to grant
inheritance to United States citizens merely requires that the alien heir
demonstrate that his foreign nation does not discriminate between its
own citizens and Americans in regard to inheritance rights." Thus,
logically the inquiry under a reciprocity statute should focus on the

nature of American citizens' inheritance rights under foreign law as
compared to the rights of citizens of the foreign country. 5 This
Perhaps the failure to explore the negative implications of the federal foreign relations power
can be explained by the availability of a similar doctrine based on a more explicit Constitutional
referrent-the federal power over foreign commerce. U.S. CONST. art, I, § 8, cl. 3: Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). Relying largely on such an implied prohibition
arising from the foreign commerce clause, the Court has overturned state statutes which unduly
burdened immigration of aliens. See Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875):
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875). However, in Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 490
(1850), the Court upheld a discriminatory tax on inheritance by nonresident aliens, rejecting the
contention that transmission of funds to nonresident aliens was foreign commerce. Id. at 493.
Arguably the more expansive contemporary definition of commerce seri6usly undercuts the
Mager rationale. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States. 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I I1 (1942).
" For decedents dying prior to 1951, an interpretation of an earlier Oregon statute prevented a
finding of reciprocity unless the foreign country allowed Americans to inherit in the sane
manner as an alien would inherit from an Oregon estate. In re Estate of Krachler, 199 Ore. 448,
263 P.2d 769 (1953), construing Ch. 399, § 1 [1937] ORE. LAWs 607. Although it is doubtful if
any countries could meet the literal requirements of this test, this law may still have some vitality
since the statutory requirements to be considered are those extant at the time of the decedent's
death, not at the time of the litigation. Mullart v. State Land Board, 222 Ore. 463, 353 P.2d 531
(1960); Clostermann v. Schmidt, 215 Ore. 55, 332 P.2d 1036 (1958), Moreover, the present
Nevada statute contains the same language as the earlier Oregon act. See NFv, REV,
STAT. §§ 134.230-.250 (1966). Since there have been no reported cases under the Nevada
statute, it is possible that the Nevada courts may adopt the reciprocity standard of the Oregon
court in Krachler.
Under the Arizona and Oklahoma statutes, an alien eligible for citizenship may take and hold
real and personal property in thesame manner as a United States citizen would under the laws of
the alien's native country. AR1Z. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-212(c) (1956); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60,
§ 121 (1963).
' "All that it [California's reciprocity statute] requires is that there be no discrimination
shown in inheritance matters between nationals of that country and residents and citizens of
ours." In re Miller's Estate, 104 Cal. App. 2d I, 12, 230 P.2d 667, 674 (1951). See also It re
Raihs, 102 Cal. App. 2d 260. 227 P.2d 564 (1951); Corbett v. Stergios, 256 Iowa 12. 126
N.W.2d 342 (1964).
-' It is doubtful, however, that mere abstract lack of discrimination would suffice where the
foreign country grants no inheritance rights to either Americans or its own citizens, even though
such a country might meet the literal requirements of the reciprocity statute. Anticipating such a
situation, the California Supreme Court has indicated that its reciprocity statute "necessarily
imports a requirement that the inheritance rights in the foreign country meet some minimum
standard of economic substantiality." In re Larkin, 65 Cal. 2d 60, 65,416 P.2d 473, 476, 52 Cal,
Rptr. 441, 442 (1966).
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inquiry is uniformly held to be a question of fact 2 and generally
requires the alien heir to produce expert testimony as to the law of his
homeland." Nevertheless, when the expert testimony involves proof of
the law of a Communist nation, the political biases of American
judges have frequently combined with the statutory burden of proof to
make a finding of reciprocity with a Communist nation a practical
impossibility."
Similarly, benefit statutes which are intended to prevent
distribution when confiscation by the foreign government is likely, 2
have been used by the state courts to express tacit hostility to foreign
governments. Wide discretion has been invested in the probate courts"3
in applying these statutes and, thus, a great variety of circumstances
have been considered relevant in deciding whether or not to allow
inheritance by a non-resident alien.. First, some courts have strictly
interpreted the benefit standard by denying alien inheritance if it is
contingently possible that the alien would not receivefiul/ benefit, use
or control of the property. 4 Minute inquiries into monetary exchange
h.g., In re Schluttig's Estate, 36 Cal. 2d 416, 224 P.2d 695 (1950). Compare In re Miller's
k'
Estate, 104 Cal. App. 2d 1,230 P.2d 667 (1951) (reciprocity with Germany found as of April 22,
. 1942), with Estate of Thramm, 80 Cal. App. 2d 756, 183 P.2d 97 (1947) (no reciprocity with
Germany as of June 3, 1943). See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS §§ 129 & 248 n.39 (1962).
"°See. e.g.. Estate of Larkin, 65 Cat. 2d 60, 416 P.2d 473, 52 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1966); State
Land Bd. v. Pekarek, 234 Ore. 74, 378 P.2d 734 (1963). See generally A. EHRENZWEIG. A
TREATISE ON THF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 248 (1962); Comment, The Application of the
Reciprocal Rights and Benefit Rules to Foreign Legacies. 36 TuL. L. REV. 799, 811 (1962).
"See. e.g.. State Land Bd. v. Pekarek, 234 Ore. 74, 378 P.2d 734 (1963), where the court said:
"Assuming, without deciding, that all of the evidence offered by the legatees was admissible, it
can be given relatively little weight. The statements of Czechoslovakian officials must be judged
in light of the interest which they had in the acquisition of funds for their government. Moreover,
in judging the credibility of these witnesses we are entitled to take into consideration the fact that
declarations of government officials in communist-controlled countries as to the state of affairs
existing within their borders do not always comport with the actual facts." Id. at 83, 378 P.2d at
738. See notes 44-45 injra.
'See. e.g., In re Reidl, 23 App. Div. 2d 171, 172, 259 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218 (1965); In re
Petroff's Estate. 49 Misc. 2d 233, 236, 267 N.Y.S.2d 8, II (Surr. Ct. 1966).
" See statutes cited note 5 supra. In addition to deciding whether an heir will receive the
benefit, use or control of property, most courts.have the statutory authority to deny distribution
"where other special circumstances make it desirable.. " E.g., N.Y. SURR. CT. PRO.
LAW § 2218-2 (McKinney Supp. 1968). While no reported cases have been decided under this
clause, its presence emphasizes the permissive character of the statute. Moreover, no special
provisions are made for de novo appellate review, and consequently probate judges' findings of
fact are virtually never reversed.
" See, e.g.. In re Braier, 305 N.Y. 148, II1N.E.2d 424, appeal dismissedsub non. Kalmane
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rates, J" currency revaluations,36 and the scope of foreign officials'
administrative discretion 7 have been entertained to deny inheritance.
Many courts38 have refused distribution on the basis of a Treasury
Regulation declaring that federal checks and warrants will not be sent
to individuals residing in certain listed countries where "there is not a
reasonable assurance that a payee in those areas will actually receive
checks or warrants . . . and be able to negotiate the same for full
value."39 Courts applying benefit statutes have examined the status of
private property ownership in the foreign country" or the effect of
inheritance taxes levied by the foreign country,4 ' or simply have taken
judicial notice of the economic disabilities in a Communist nation and
proceeded no further.42 Some courts have denied inheritance on the
basis of a fear that proceeds from American estates would be used to
v. Green, 346 U.S. 802 (1953); In re Greenberg, 46 Misc. 2d 883. 261 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Surr. Ct.
1939); Wolder's Estate, 28 Pa. D. & C. 2d 51 (Orphans' Ct. 1962).
11E.g., Petition of Mazurowski, 331 Mass. 33, 38, 116 N.E.2d 854, 858 (1954); In reShefick's
Estate, 50 Misc. 2d 293, 270 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Surr. Ct. 1966). See generally Berman. Soviet Heirs
in American Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 266-68 (1962).
36 In re Wells, 204 Misc. 975, 980-81, 126 N.Y.S.2d 441,447-48 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
" E.g., In re Estate of Feierman, 202 Cal. App. 2d 552, 20 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1962): In re
Markewitsh, 62 N.J. Super. 407, 163 A.2d 232 (Passaic County Ct., P. Div. 1960); It re Braier,
305 N.Y. 148, II1 N.E.2d 424, appeal dismissed sub non. Kalmane v. Green, 346 U.S. 802
(1953). See generally Bader, Brown & Grzybowski, Soviet Inheritance Cases in American
Courts and the Soviet Property Regimne. 1966 DUKE L.J. 98; Berman, supra note 35, at 273 &
n.43.
"See, e.g.. In re Markewitsh, 62 N.J. Super. 407, 163 A.2d 232 (Passaic County Ct., P. Div.
1960); In re Siegler, 284 App. Div. 436, 132 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1954); Wolder's Estate, 28 Pa. D. &
C. 2d 51, 53 (Orphans' Ct. 1962). See also In.re Offinger, 28 Misc. 2d 633, 215 N.Y.S.2d 642
(Surr. Ct. 1961); In re Doktor, 18 Misc. 2d 223, 183 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Surr. Ct. 1959).
331 C.F.R. § 211.2 (1966).
"'See,e.g., In re Bold's Estate, 173 Misc. 545, 549, 18 N.Y.S.2d 291, 295 (Surr. Ct. 1940):
Sobko Estate, 88 Pa. D. & C. 76 (Orphans' Ct. 1954), where the court remarked: "From such
information as is available to us concerning the status of the individual in these so-called 'Iron
Curtain' states, there would appear to be little doubt that these unfortunate people have been
enslaved by a vicious government which deprives them of many of the rights enjoyed by the free
peoples of the world, including the fundamental right of private ownership of property." Id. at
77.
In re Bold's Estate, 173 Misc. 545, 18 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
E.g.. In re Volencki, 35 N.J. Super. 351, 114 A.2d 26 (Mercer County Ct.. P. Div. 1955).
In another case involving a good deal of expert testimony, the court felt it in order to "takejudicial notice of the wholesale disregard of human and of property rights in the USSR and of the
complete lack of morals, as we know them, pervading the operation of the Soviet system. We are
satisfied that the recipients might by fraud be represented as receiving these goods and, should
the signatures on the receipts be genuine, they might have been obtained by coercion or
misrepresentation." Zupko Estate, 15 Pa. D. & C. 2d 442,454-55 (Orphans' Ct. 1958).
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finance wars against the United States. 3 Others have eschewed the
possibility of enhancing the financial status of non-democratic
nations. " The degree of judicial invective sometimes surrounding the
proceedings under these statutes might indicate that the only objective
being fostered by their use was the expression of local disapproval of
certain foreign nations. 5 This uncertain standard of benefit, combined
with the possibility of a hostile court, may render the statutory burden
of proof placed upon the alien claimant insurmountable.
" E.g.. In re Karban, 118 Cal. App. 2d 240, 257 P.2d 649 (1953), where the court said,
"property and money of persons dying in this country should remain here and not be sent to
foreign countries and be used in waging a war. . . against the United States." Id. at 244, 257
P.2d at 652. Another court expressed fears that funds remitted to the Soviet Union would be
used to sabotage American industry. In re Landau's Esltate, 172 Misc. 651, 16 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Surr.
Ct. 1939).
In adopting a nonresident alien inheritance statute in 1941, the California legislature
appended a "statement of urgency" in order that the act would take effect immediately. This
statement recited, in part, that "[a] great number of foreign nations are either at war, preparing
for war or under the control and domination of conquering nations with the result that money
and property left to citizens of California is impounded in such foreign countries or taken by
confiscatory taxes for war uses. . . . Because the foreign governments guilty of these practices
constitute a direct threat to the Government of the United States, it is immediately necessary
that the property and money of citizens dying in this country should remain in this country and
not be sent to such foreign countries to be used for the purposes of waging a war that eventually
may be directed against the. . . United States." Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia
and its Satellites to Share in Estates oJ American Decedents, 25 S. CAL. L. REV. 297, 304
n.53 (1952). See also Heyman, The Nonresident Alien's Right to Succession Under the "'Iron
( urtain Rule.' 52 Nw. U.L. Ri v. 221, 229 nn.57 & 58, 234 & nn.96-99 (1957): Comment,
State Regulation of .Nonresident AIlien Inheritance .-ln Anontol" in Foreign Policy. 18 U.
Cm. L. RL-. 329, 331-33 (1951).
"The concurring opinion in In re Hosova's Estate, 143 Mont. 74, 387 P.2d 305 (1963)
expressed regret that "in affirming this decision the writer is knowingly contributing financial
aid to a Communist monolithic satellite, fanatically dedicated to the abolishing of the freedom
and liberty of the citizens of this nation.
"By reason of self-hypnosis and failure to understand the aims and objectives of the
international Communist conspiracy, in the year 1946, Montana did not have statutes to estop
us from making cash contributions to our own ultimate destruction as a free nation." Id. at 8586, 387 P.2d at 311.
In in re Getream, 200 Misc. 543, 107 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Surr. Ct. 1951), the court said that it
"would consider sending money out of this country and into Hungary tantamount to putting
funds within the grasp of the Communists." Id. at 544, 107 N.Y.S.2d at 226. In another case,
the judge took "judicial notice" that "funds transmitted to citizens of [the Soviet Union] are
confiscated or diverted by the state or its officials and fail to reach the intended beneficiaries."
Sobko Estate, 88 Pa. D. & C. 76, 77-78 (Orphans' Ct. 1954). See also Berman, supra note 35, at
257 & nn.2 & 3.
" One commentator reports that in Pennsylvania, a judge stated at the trial of a case involving
a Soviet heir that "[ilf you want to say that I'm prejudiced, you can, because when it cumes to
Communism I'm a bigoted anti-Communist." In a California case, the trial judge took "judicial
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Although Clark seemed to foreclose constitutional attack upon
such applications of alien inheritance statutes as interfering with
federal control of foreign relations, petitioners before the Supreme
Court have twice sought to inhibit the zeal of probate judges with
arguments based upon the due process and equal protection
provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Both appeals involved New
York's benefit statute, and both were dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question.16 However, the second of these cases,
Ioannou v. New York, was notable for its dissent in which the author
of Clark4 indicated his willingness in light of subsequent events to
reexamine the rationale of that case. Arguing that other areas of case
law recognize an exclusive federal power over foreign affairs,48 the
Ioannou dissent implied that the actual effect of the state's reciprocity
statute on international affairs was determinative of the constitutional
notice that Russia kicks the United States in the teeth all the time." and told counsel for the
Soviet claimant that "I would think your firm would feel it honor bound to withdraw as
representing the Russian government." Berman, supra note 35. at n.257 (emphasis added). See
also notes 31, 40 & 44, supra.
"6In re Braier's Estate, 305 N.Y. 148, 11iN.E.2d 424, appeal dismised sub nonm. Kalmane v.
Green, 346 U.S. 802 (1953), presented an issue of procedural due process because of the
surrogate's failure to grant a hearing before ordering deposit of inheritance. The New York
Court of Appeals found three grounds for its conclusion that there was no denial of due process.
First, the court reasoned that a hearing was not necessa.y because the legatee had not been
deprived of title to the property under the New York statute. See note 5supra. Further, since the
Consular Section of the Hungarian Legation had raised only issues of law, a hearing on these
issues at the appellate level was sufficient to satisfy the mandate of due process. Finally, the
court noted that if the legatee could later come forward with proof that conditions in Hungary
would allow her to receive the benefit of the legacy, a hearing would then be granted on the
propriety of withdrawing the funds. Id. at 159, Ill N.E.2d at 428-29.
In In re Marek's Estate, I I N.Y.2d 740, 181 N.E.2d 456, appeal dismissed sub norm. Ioannou
v. New York, 371 U.S. 30 (1962), the surrogate refused to deliver an estate share assigned by a
Czechoslovakian beneficiary to a niece domiciled in London. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court, petitioner alleged that due process and equal protection considerations were presented by
the New York court's refusal, without a hearing, to give effect to an alleged voluntary
assignment by the alien beneficiary. See Boyd, supra note 8, at 488-89 & nn.82-83.
" Mr. Justice Douglas authored Clark, the loannou dissent, and Zschernig.
",The dissent began by recognizing that article I, section 10 of the Constitution imposes severe
limitations upon the several states' power to affect the foreign relations of the United States,
then cited dicta from Supreme Court opinions for the proposition that federal power over
foreign affairs is exclusive. loannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See notes 22-24 supra.
The dissent further maintained that other areas of law suggest that foreign policy can be
shaped solely by the federal government: "Our courts will not inquire into the validity of an act
of a recognized foreign state (Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 [1917]). ...
Likewise, a foreign country is immune from suit for injuries caused in its commercial
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issue in Clark,' stating that the latter case did not insulate the alien
inheritance statutes from challenge under the exclusive federal foreign
relations power when the statutes did, in practice, "affect
international relations in a persistent and subtle way.'' 49
The recent case of Zschernig v. Miller" provided the Supreme
Court with a satisfactory vehicle for reevaluating the Clark position.
In Zschernig the East German heirs of an Oregon intestate chose not
to show, under Oregon's hybrid statute, that Americans were
accorded reciprocal inheritance rights by East Germany and could
receive payment from East German estates, and that East German
heirs would receive the benefit, use or control of American estate
shares." Rather, the heirs proceeded entirely under federal law,
arguing that the 1923 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular
Rights with Germany52 remained effective despite the post-World
War II partition of that country, and thus that the treaty's clause
regarding alien inheritance of real estate partially preempted state
law. Further, the heirs contended that the Oregon statute was
unconstitutional 3 since, in practice, its impact upon international
transactions (Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 [1925]).. .. But, if the Executive
Department of the Federal Government indicates its views on whether immunity should be
allowed, those views will control. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 [19441.'" Id. at
31-32 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
S'371 U.S. at 32 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
The provisions of the statute are:
"(I) The right of an alien not residing within the United States or its territories to take either
real or personal property or the proceeds thereof in this state by succession or testamentary
disposition, upon the same terms and conditions as inhabitants and citizens of the United States,
is dependent in each case: (a) Upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of
the United States to take real and personal property and the proceeds thereof upon the same
terms and conditions as inhabitants and citizens of the country of which such alien is an
inhabitant or citizen; (b) Upon the right of citizens of the United States to receive by payment to
them within the United States or its territories money originating from the estates of persons
dying within such foreign country; and (c) Upon proof that such foreign heirs, distributees,
devisees or legatees may receive the benefit, use or control of money or property from estates of
persons dying in this state without confiscation, in whole or in part, by the governments of such
foreign countries.
"(2) The burden is upon such nonresident alien to establish the. fact of existence of the
reciprocal rights set forth in subsection (1)of this section.
"(3) If such reciprocal rights are not found to exist and if no heir, devisee or legatee other than
such alien is found eligible to take such property, the property shall be disposed of'as escheated

property."
"

ORE. REv. STAT.

§§ 111.070(1)-(3) (1967).

Dec. 8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132, T.S. No. 725. See note 14supra.
The dual thrust of the heirs' major constitutional argument was responsive both to Clark
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affairs was a substantial interference with the exclusive federal foreign
relations power.54 By offering no proof under the Oregon statute, the
Zschernig plaintiffs paradoxically had to rely upon judicial practices

in prior cases to substantiate their major constitutional contention
that state court assessments of the quality of various rights in foreign
countries could adversely affect foreign relations.-" Accepting the
heirs' treaty argument, the Oregon Supreme Court allowed
inheritance of the realty by the German heirs.56 However, since the
heirs had offered no proof under the alien inheritance statute and
because the Oregon court believed their constitutional attack to be
foreclosed by Clark, the state court held that the personalty must

escheat."
Accepting the Oregon Supreme Court's treaty ruling, 5 '
Zschernig's heirs nevertheless sought review in the U.S. Supreme

Court of their constitutional challenge to the Oregon statutory
scheme. In contradistinction to its approach in Clark, the Court on
appeal in Zschernig considered whether, even in the absence of

conflicting executive or congressional action, the constitutional
grant of foreign affairs powers to the national government carried

with it an implied negative on certain types of state activity. The
and loannou. On the one hand the heirs sought to demonstrate that Oregon's law, in the light of
its judicially-stated purpose to induce foreign nations to guarantee inheritance rights to
Americans, see note 26 supra, was "tantamount to the State of Oregon proposing to the nations
of the world a compact, an agreement that they conform their inheritance laws to Oregon's.
Brief for Appellant at 59, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); see Clark v. Allen, 331
U.S. 503, 517; text at notes 10-15 supra. In chronicling judicial intemperance under the Oregon
statute, appellant further emphasized that, as of the date of Clark, none of the offending judicial
practices had occurred. Brief for Appellant at 62, Zschernig v. Miller, supra;cJ. loannou v. New
York, 371 U.S. at 33 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See text at note 15 supra.
" See note 24 supra.
" Brief for Appellant at 25-64, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
36 243 Ore. 567, 591, 412 P.2d 781, 793 (1966).
"' Id. at 587-88, 412 P.2d at 79 1.
"8Filing as amicus curiae, the Solicitor General urged that Clark'sconstruction of the 1923
Treaty with Germany be reversed so as to allow foreign citizens to inherit personalty as well as
realty from American estates. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, Zschcrnig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). The Government took this position because identical or very
similar provisions are found in ten treaties presently in force. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at nn.3 & 4, Zschernig v. Miller, supra. Thus, the Court was presented with a
possible non-constitutional basis for achieving the same result. Zschernig v. Miller, supra at 443
(Harlan, J., concurring); cJf Ashwander v. T.V.A.. 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J,,
concurring); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S.
175 (1909). The majority of the Court, however, declined this invitation to base its holding on
non-constitutional grounds. 389 U.S. at 432.
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Zschernig majority found that various state courts had, in prior cases,
made minute inquiries into the administration of foreign legal
systems, 9 the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements, 6° and the
quality of "rights" secured by foreign laws. 6' Maintaining that such
actions must affect international relations "in a persistent and subtle
way, '"62 the majority ruled the Oregon statute unconstitutional
because of its capacity to impair the power of the national government
to deal with foreign affairs.61 In so holding, the Zschernig Court
distinguished rather than overruled Clark on the basis that the Oregon
statute as construed would have "more than 'some incidental or
indirect effect in foreign countries.' "64
By distinguishing Clark, Zschernig allows some degree of
continued vitality for the alien inheritance statutes now enacted. The
Court undoubtedly wanted to avoid the implication that reciprocity
was an improper basis for determining the rights of aliens or that state
courts could not read, construe and apply foreign law. 61 Indeed, the
Court suggests that accepting as conclusive proof of reciprocity the
statement of a foreign ambassador that reciprocal rights exist in his
nation would still be a proper mode of procedure under an alien
inheritance statute.66 However, the Court's broad gauge assault on
any state activities which could potentially embarrass the federal
government in the conduct of foreign relations 67 makes it very difficult
,1389 U.S. at 433-34, 436-37, citing State Land Bd. v. Rogers, 219 Ore. 233, 347 P.2d 57
(1959).
389 U.S. at 434. 436, cihing In re Krachler, 199 Ore. 448, 263 P.2d 769 (1953).
389 U.S. at 434, 439-40, citing In re Krachler, 199 Ore. 448, 263 P.2d 769 (1953).
1: 389 U.S. at 440.
11Id. at 441.
6 Id. at 434 (emphasis added). See text at notes 81-82 infra.
" "State courts, or course, must frequently read, construe, and apply laws of foreign nations.
It' has never been seriously suggested that state courts are precluded from performing that
Id.
I..-at 433.
function .
6 Id. at 433 n.5. For a case in which a court applying a benefit statute accepted the certificate
of the Russian ambassador that citizens of that country would receive the benefit, use and
control of an American estate share, see In re Alexandroff's Estate, 61 N.Y.S.2d 866 (N.Y.
County Sur. Ct. 1945).
The variety of characterizations indulged by the majority opinion obscures the precise
gravamen of a constitutional challenge under the Zschernig doctrine. The court noted that
several criteria have been employed by Oregon courts in applying their alien inheritance statute,
seemingly questioning the propriety of each: (1) whether aliens under the law of their homeland
have enforceable "rights" as we know them, 389 U.S. at 436-37, 439-40; (2) whether foreign
laws contain any element of confiscation, id. at 435; and (3) whether the statements of officials
of foreign nations are credible or made in good faith, id. at 436. Concomitantly, the Court
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to assess the precise limits of a federal court's power to censure state
action in the area of inheritance that in any way may affect foreign
affairs.
Since the Zschernig Court was primarily concerned with the
inheritance statute's potential to impair the effective exercise of the

nation's foreign policy, 68 nothing in the opinion suggests that an
actual diplomatic complaint is a necessary concomitant to a finding
of unconstitutionality, although the Court did note one instance in

which the Oregon statute was the subject of such a complaint.!9 The

presence of an actual complaint seems merely to underscore the

Court's judgment that the statute as applied can affect foreign
relations. Since the test adopted by the Court requires only a showing
of potential impairment of federal power, it may be appropriate for
the Court to go beyond the record in the instant case to determine

whether such a potential for disruption is inferable from past
applications of the challenged statute.70 Indeed, all of the evidence of
potential impairment of the federal foreign relations power in
maintains that the decisions of the Oregon courts "radiate some of the attitudes of the 'cold
war,' " that "foreign policy attitudes . . .and the like are the real desiderata," and implies that
Oregon has been "permitted to establish its own foreign policy." Id. at 435, 437. and 441.
Apparently the common objectionable thread running through all these various actions is that
each has "a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the
central government to deal with those problems." Id. at 44 1. Whether any single instance of the
sundry condemned activities would be a sufficient index of the tendency ol'a statute as applied to
impair the effective exercise of the nation's foreign policy, or whether it is the cumulative effect
of many such instances that renders the statute unconstitutional is not entirely clear. The latter
interpretation is indicated by the Court's statement that "the type of probate law that Oregon
enforces affects international relations in a persistent and subtle way." Id. at 440 (emphasis
added).
" For instance, the Court at one point maintains that the Oregon statute's "great potential
for disruption or embarrassment makes us hesitate to place it in the category of a diplomatic
bagatelle." 389 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added). Elsewhere the Court concludes that the statute
"'has a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the
central government to deal with those problems." Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
69 The Court noted a letter, written by a State Department adviser to an Oregon court, which
stated: "The Government of Bulgaria has raised with this Government the matter of difficulties
reportedly being encountered by Bulgarian citizens resident in Bulgaria in obtaining the transfer
to them of property or funds from estates probated in this country, some under the jurisdiction
of the State of Oregon .... " 389 U.S. at 437 n.7.
'oThus, the Court can summarily dismiss the Justice Department's claim that the application
of the Oregon statute, in the circumstances of the Zchernig litigation, did not unduly interfere
with the conduct of foreign relations, see 389 U.S. at 434, citing Brief for United States as
amicus curiae, p. 6, n.5, since this fact is simply not pertinent to the constitutional inquiry which
the Court conducts, namely whether the statute has the potential to impair the exercise of the
nation's foreign policy. See note 63 supra.
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Zschernig was derived from prior experience with the statute7 ' since
that case at the state court level involved an order of escheat because
of the heirs' failure to offer any proof of conditions in East
Germany. 72 Moreover, Zschernig implicitly establishes a judicial,
rather than an executive, prerogative to make the ultimate
determination as to a statute's potential impairment of the federal
foreign relations function.73 This judicial willingness to undertake an
independent factual assessment of matters affecting foreign relations
provides an interesting contrast to the Court's approach in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino" where it was similarly concerned
with protecting the executive -department's prerogative to conduct
foreign affairs. In Sabbatino the Court found that Act-of-State cases
presented a recurrent factual situation"' in which action by the
judiciary might hinder diplomatic efforts by the executive department,
"Thus, the Court seems to consider the continued judicial proclivity to allow local foreign
policy biases to permeate the decision-making process to be sufficient to infect an entire statute,
concededly valid as written, and render it unconstitutional. Apparently, states whose courts have
in the past engaged in any of the activities condemned by Zschernig must, either by legislative or
judicial action, affirmatively insure that their statutes cannot be applied in a manner which
could impair the capacity of the federal government to conduct foreign affairs.
The California Supreme Court seems to have effectively eliminated one frequent source of
friction under the alien inheritance statutes in ruling that state court inquiries into foreign
currency regulations are improper because, ". . . to embark upon any such adventure would
gravely imperil the constitutionality of section 259 by involving our courts in matters of
international monetary policy which may be within the exclusive province of federal authority."
In re Chichernea, 66 Cal. 2d 83, 105, 57 Cal. Rptr. 135, 150, 424 P.2d 687. 702 (1967).
, See text at note 57 supra.
Not only did the Court have before it the Justice Department's claim that the Zschernig
litigation presented no interference with the conduct of the nation's foreign policy, see note 70
supra, but also a more generalized executive department assessment of the effect of reciprocity
statutes: "The Department of State has advised us . . . that State reciprocity laws, including
that of Oregon, have had little effect on the foreign relations and policy of this country ....
Appellants' apprehension of a deterioration in international relations, unsubstantiated by
experience, does not constitute the kind of 'changed conditions' which might call for a reexamination of Clark v. Allen." 389 U.S. at 460 n.29 quoting Memorandum for United States.
p. 5. In contradistinction to this is the Court's judgment that "b[i]t seems inescapable that the
type of probate law that Oregon enforces affects international relations in a persistent and subtle
way." 389 U.S. at 440.
"376 U.S. 398 (1964); see Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power ol the Federal Courts:
Sabbatino. 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1964).
" A typical Act of State case involves the confiscation of private property coincident with a
revolution in a foreign land. See. e.g.. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Republic of Iraq v. First National
City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966). If jurisdiction can be
obtained in a court, the ensuing controversy between claimants under the confiscating
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and consequently announced a federal rule that judges should not
examine the validity of property confiscation by a foreign government
within its own territory.76 The effect of this doctrine was to force
parties aggrieved by such a foreign confiscation to seek their exclusive
remedy with the executive branch. Thus, Sabbatino's protection for
the executive was achieved by way of judicial abstention while
Zschernig purports to protect the foreign relations power by marked
activism. In general, it may be conceded that the former approach is
preferable since the judiciary's role in affecting foreign relations
should undoubtedly be a limited one. However, there are vital
distinctions between Zschernig and Sabbatino which indicate that the
activism of the Zschernig Court was not inappropriate. The
fundamental distinction is that.Zschernig involved the allocation of
power between the two sovereignties of our federal system while
Sabbatino did not. 7 Thus, Zschernig's insistence upon an independent
judicial assessment of the relevant facts was required by the Court's
role as interpreter of the Constitution, while the Sabbatino Court's
deference to an executive remedy was permissible because no question
of constitutional interpretation was involved in that case. Moreover,
from a pragmatic viewpoint, the Zschernig situation may have been
one in which the executive branch was incapable of taking effective
action since either treaty arrangements with Communist nations or a
federal statute governing alien inheritance might encounter
substantial domestic political obstacles.
Zschernig represents the first case in which the preemptive effect
of the exclusive federal foreign relations power was the sole basis for
the Court's decision.7 8 While this might indicate an increased judicial
concern with protecting the federal government's power to conduct
diplomacy, the possible applicability of the Zschernig doctrine to
areas of state action other than alien inheritance statutes 9 is difficult
government and under the original owners will revolve around the question of the validity of the
taking which the foreign regime effected. American courts have traditionally refused to pass on
such an issue although the reasons given have varied. See A. :HRI:NZWhIG. \ TRi TlSi- )
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 48 (1962).

76376 U.S. at 428.
" The text of the Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine: it does not
irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of
state." 376 U.S. at 423. Moreover, implicit in'the Sabbatino Court's approach was the view that
the Constitution did not require judicial, as opposed to executive, resolution of the issues
involved.
'" See note 25 supra.
" See Moore, Federalismand Foreign Relations. 1965 DuKE L.J. 248, 311-17.
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'to assess due to the Court's almost exclusive concern with describing
the operation of the particular type of statute before it."0 Indeed, the
Zschernig Court characterizes as "remote" the possibility that other
forms of litigation will have an effect upon international relations,"'
thus ironically echoing the judgment in Clark that reciprocity statutes
would have only "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign
countries." 2 Given the debilitation of that position in Zschernig,
however, it seems unlikely that one may safely predict the precise
limitations of the preemptive effect of the federal foreign relations
power solely by characterizing the impact of state action upon foreign
affairs as either "direct" or "remote." 3

See notes 67-68 supra.
389 U.S. at 433.
Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947).
"Some of the uncertainty inherent in the direct-or-indirect-effect test might be avoided were
the Court to adopt a balancing test analogous to that employed to determine the preemptive
effect of the commerce clause. Under this approach, the judiciary could closely scrutinize the
nature of the state interests purportedl) advanced by the regulation in question, weighing that
interest against the national governmental interest in controlling foreign affairs, and assessing
the possibilities of interference stemming from the state enactment. See Moore, supra note 79. at
299-301. By focusing on whether any legitimate state interests are actually served by the
regulation, the judiciary might avoid placement of undue emphasis upon the largely speculative
assessment of the statute's potential effect on foreign affairs. Thus, in reviewing a reciprocity
statute, it might be determined that the real purpose of the act is to induce foreign nations to
alter their inheritance policies toward American citizens, a goal outside the scope of state power
under the theory that the national executive is the sole constitutional representative in foreign
affairs. Likewise, an interest in preventing funds from being transmitted to disfavored or
unfriendly foreign countries under benefit statutes should arguably fall. Finally, a careful
analysis of the state's interest in allowing inheritance to some heirs while denying it to others on
the basis of nationality and related factors may give rise to an effective equal protection
argument that the states have no legitimate interest in making such a distinction, the asserted
state interests being incompatible with national supremacy in the foreign relations area. See
generally Boyd, The Invalidity of State Statutes Governing the Share of.Nonresident .4liens in
Decedents" :.tates. 51 Qho. L.J. 470, 485-92 (1963).

